



Integration of ISO 14971 Requirements into the Design Processes of Class III Life-Sustaining Medical Devices

Sandeep Reddy Koppula

Senior Quality Engineer-Senseonics Holdings, Germantown, Maryland

ksandeepreddy3@gmail.com

Received: 20 Mar 2026; Received in revised form: 14 Apr 2026; Accepted: 19 Apr 2026; Available online: 23 Apr 2026

Abstract— This article examines how ISO 14971 requirements can be embedded into the design processes of Class III life-sustaining medical devices as an operating design discipline. The subject is relevant because implantable and life-sustaining systems combine severe clinical consequences of failure with complex interactions among materials, software, mechanical components, and use conditions. The aim is to develop an analytical model for integrating risk management into design planning, evidence generation, and lifecycle control. The study relies on recent scientific and regulatory publications focused on high-risk devices, implantable systems, quality system regulation, post-market surveillance, cybersecurity, and clinical evaluation. Comparative analysis, conceptual synthesis, and analytical generalization were used. The analytical part shows that effective integration requires early hazard framing, traceability between risk controls and verification evidence, and continuous transfer of post-market signals into design change logic. The proposed interpretation has practical value for quality engineering, design reviews, and regulatory readiness of Class III medical technologies.

Keywords— ISO 14971, Class III medical devices, life-sustaining devices, design controls, risk management, implantable devices, regulatory compliance, verification and validation, post-market surveillance, reliability engineering.

I. INTRODUCTION

The design of Class III life-sustaining medical devices cannot be reduced to technical optimization alone. In this product category, every design decision has safety, verification, and regulatory consequences. The tighter the physiological coupling between device and patient, the less tolerance remains for fragmented development logic. For implantable and life-sustaining technologies, risk management must be integrated into the design process at the point when intended use, user need, and system architecture are first defined.

This article aims to develop an analytical framework for integrating ISO 14971 requirements into the design processes of Class III life-sustaining medical devices.

The first research objective is to determine where ISO 14971 requirements should be inserted into the design process so that risk management shapes design planning, inputs, outputs, and design review activity. The second research objective is to identify how the specific properties of high-risk implantable and life-sustaining devices change the content of hazard analysis and the structure of verification and validation evidence. The third research objective is to formulate an implementation logic that connects premarket risk controls with post-market signal capture and design change management.

The study develops an original analytical model for embedding ISO 14971 into the full design logic of Class III life-sustaining medical devices. Its novelty lies in treating risk management as a design-

driving and evidence-forming mechanism that connects pre-market controls, verification and validation evidence, post-market surveillance findings, and design change decisions within a single lifecycle structure.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The source base combined recent systematic reviews, narrative reviews, retrospective cohort data, regulatory analyses, and current FDA (Food and Drug Administration) regulatory texts relevant to Class III and other high-risk medical devices [14]. Screening focused on publications from 2023 to 2026 that addressed one or more of the following domains: integration of risk management into quality systems and design controls, clinical evaluation and regulatory oversight of high-risk devices, implantable-device engineering constraints, reliability and long-term stability, cybersecurity in benefit-risk evaluation, and post-market surveillance for complex medical technologies. The selected literature covers three interconnected layers of inquiry: regulatory harmonization and evidence expectations [3; 4; 6; 7; 11], risk expansion in implantable and life-sustaining technologies [2; 5; 8; 10; 12; 13], and lifecycle feedback from clinical evidence and post-market observation [1; 9; 12].

Methods. The article uses comparative analysis to align regulatory and engineering interpretations, source analysis to extract recurring design obligations, conceptual synthesis to connect risk management with design control checkpoints, typologization to structure major integration points, and analytical generalization to formulate an implementation model suitable for Class III life-sustaining devices.

III. RESULTS

The recent regulatory trajectory makes one point difficult to ignore that risk management is increasingly built into the quality architecture that governs design itself. The regulatory change that became operational on February 2, 2026, was significant because the FDA's Quality Management System Regulation incorporated ISO 13485:2016 by reference and explicitly positioned risk management within the governing quality framework for device design and development [3; 4]. For Class III life-

sustaining devices, this changes the practical meaning of design control. Risk analysis is no longer an accessory to design planning. It becomes one of the mechanisms through which planning decisions are justified, staged, reviewed, and translated into objective evidence.

That regulatory shift matters because the design process for a life-sustaining implant does not fail at a single point. Failure can arise from material degradation, energy instability, interface drift, software behavior, infection pathways, thrombogenic or inflammatory responses, use errors, or weak clinical evidence regarding long-term performance [2; 8; 10; 12; 13]. When ISO 14971 is inserted too late, these problems are discovered as testing surprises or review deficiencies [15]. When it is inserted early, it works differently. It helps define which design inputs are safety-critical, which interfaces require tighter tolerances, which verification methods need physiological realism, and which residual risks must remain visible during review and labeling decisions [2; 6; 8; 13].

A consistent pattern across recent publications is that implantable and life-sustaining devices expand the hazard field beyond conventional component failure. Reviews on vascular implants, implantable sensors, and long-term bioelectronic reliability converge on the same engineering reality: device safety in vivo depends on interactions between hardware, biological environment, time, and clinical use conditions [2; 10; 13]. Material choice influences corrosion behavior, encapsulation stability, inflammatory response, and signal integrity [8; 10]. Mechanical architecture influences fatigue, sealing, lead durability, and interface strain [2; 8]. Miniaturization and sensing sophistication create additional exposure to drift, power limitations, packaging defects, and failure modes that may not appear under simplified bench assumptions [10; 13]. In such systems, hazard analysis cannot be limited to component catalogs. It has to model functional degradation pathways over time.

This point becomes even sharper when evidence from different high-risk domains is compared. The systematic review of CE-marked high-risk glucose-management devices found clinically meaningful benefits, yet it simultaneously highlighted short study duration and methodological

heterogeneity in the evidence base [1]. The quantitative study on Medical Device Regulation clinical evaluation burden reached a related conclusion from another angle, showing that manufacturers face substantial pressure when stronger high-risk evidence expectations meet limited internal readiness for expanded evaluation requirements [7]. The review of medical device trials in the European Union notes that a risk management plan aligned with ISO 14971 is expected within the trial oversight logic, which places design assumptions, clinical investigation strategy, and benefit-risk framing into a single evidentiary chain [11]. Taken together, these publications suggest that for Class III life-sustaining devices, ISO 14971 integration is inseparable from evidence strategy. A weak connection between hazard definition and clinical investigation design does not stay confined to documentation. It weakens the credibility of the entire safety case for the device [1; 7; 11].

A second cross-source pattern concerns the movement from static hazard lists to dynamic risk architecture. The cybersecurity review demonstrates that regulators increasingly expect connected-device risks to be incorporated into benefit-risk evaluations, yet practical guidance on how to do so remains uneven across jurisdictions [5]. That observation matters far beyond software-only products. Many contemporary life-sustaining devices operate within broader digital ecosystems that involve telemetry, wireless configuration, or data-dependent clinical decision pathways. In these circumstances, cybersecurity is not external to patient safety. It becomes a route through which safety, performance, and trustworthiness can degrade [5]. ISO 14971 integration into design has to account for threat-driven failure initiation.

The same logic applies to post-market information. The empirical analysis of high-risk device surveillance across regulatory data sources shows that hardware modifications are more effective at reducing recurrence than software-only corrective actions. At the same time, software-driven issues remain persistent in some product groups [9]. The retrospective cohort study on cardiac implantable electronic device infections reinforces the value of real-world signal capture by showing that knowledge of risk factors can inform decisions about device type,

upgrades, replacements, and prophylactic measures [12]. From a design perspective, post-market surveillance should be treated as a continuing source of evidence that tests whether validated safety assumptions remain stable under real clinical use. It reveals whether the original risk controls were robust enough under actual clinical variability, implant duration, maintenance patterns, and patient selection [9; 12].

At the design stage, this leads to a practical conclusion. ISO 14971 should be mapped onto design controls as a sequence of decision gates, not as a file created in parallel. During design planning, risk management defines the scope of critical interfaces, foreseeable misuse, and essential performance boundaries. During design input development, it forces safety claims into measurable requirements. During design output generation, it makes visible which outputs are true risk controls and which are merely enabling features. During verification, it tests whether risk controls operate as intended under relevant technical and environmental conditions. During validation, it examines whether user interaction, clinical workflow, and real-use conditions preserve the intended safety margin. During design transfer and change control, it prevents production adaptation or late modification from undermining earlier control assumptions [3; 4; 6; 11].

The literature on implantable technologies helps explain why this gate-based interpretation is preferable to linear compliance mapping. Reviews of implantable sensors and bioelectronic medicine repeatedly emphasize that long-term performance depends on stability over time [10; 13]. A design that passes early verification can still fail clinically if packaging permeability, biofouling, material fatigue, signal degradation, or tissue response were underestimated during hazard framing [8; 10; 13]. For Class III life-sustaining devices, residual risk evaluation has to be anchored in temporal realism. It should ask whether the control remains effective after implantation-related stress, prolonged exposure to body fluids, repeated use cycles, or clinically plausible maintenance scenarios.

Figure 1 summarizes this integration logic by adapting the challenge structure reported for implantable sensors and translating it into a design-

process view relevant to Class III life-sustaining devices [13].




Fig. 1. Integration logic for embedding ISO 14971 into the design process of Class III life-sustaining devices (author's analytical reconstruction adapted from the challenge typology in [13])

A further implication follows from the convergence of regulatory and engineering literature. ISO 14971 integration works best when traceability is bidirectional. Design inputs should point to hazards, but hazards should also point forward to verification evidence, validation rationale, and post-market monitoring targets. Without that structure, risk files become archival. With it, they become operational. For Class III life-sustaining devices, that distinction affects review readiness, investigation design, and patient safety simultaneously.

IV. DISCUSSION

The literature supports a stricter interpretation of ISO 14971 integration than the one often seen in routine development practice. For Class III life-sustaining devices, risk management should not be positioned as a review package compiled around milestones. It should function as the design grammar that determines what the team treats as a requirement, what it accepts as evidence, and what it escalates for redesign. A useful implementation model begins with one decision: every major design artifact must answer a risk question. If a document, review, or test does not change the understanding of hazardous situations, control effectiveness, residual risk, or monitoring need, its place in a high-risk development program should be reconsidered.

The first operational step is to connect the intended use to a structured hazard map before architecture freeze. At this stage, teams need more than a conventional failure list. They need a layered description of clinical-harm pathways, component-level initiating events, interface vulnerabilities, foreseeable use deviations, and degradation mechanisms that emerge only over time. The purpose of Table 1 is to show how ISO 14971 can be distributed across design control checkpoints so that risk activity changes the content of development, not merely its documentation.

The comparison in Table 1 shows that integration depends less on the number of documents and more on timing, ownership, and test relevance. The common weakness in high-risk programs is not the absence of a risk file. It is the delayed conversion of hazards into design-driving requirements. Once that delay appears, verification becomes generic, validation becomes defensive, and design reviews lose their discriminating function.

A second implementation issue concerns what should be monitored after the design freeze. Life-sustaining implants operate in changing biological and clinical environments. That means residual risk cannot be managed solely through complaint handling. Monitoring has to be built around leading indicators that reveal weakening control effectiveness before catastrophic harm accumulates. Table 2 presents a monitoring structure suited to this task.

Table 1. Operational integration of ISO 14971 within the design controls of Class III life-sustaining devices [1–10]

Design control stage	ISO 14971 activity	Primary output	Main decision question	Escalation trigger
Design planning	Risk management planning and initial hazard framing	Risk management plan linked to the development plan	Which functions, interfaces, and clinical scenarios require heightened control?	Unclear intended use, uncertain essential performance, unresolved hazard ownership
Design inputs	Translation of hazards into measurable requirements	Safety-critical input set	Are the requirements specific enough to control identified harms?	Inputs describe features but not risk boundaries
Architecture and design outputs	Allocation of risk controls to hardware, software, materials, labeling, and workflow	Risk-linked outputs matrix	Is each relevant hazard controlled by a defined design element or justified information control?	Controls depend on vague future testing or unspecified user behavior
Verification	Confirmation of control effectiveness	Risk control verification evidence	Did the control work under technically relevant stress conditions?	Testing omits physiological, environmental, or interface stressors
Validation	Confirmation of intended use conditions	Use and clinical validation rationale	Does the integrated device remain safe and effective in realistic use?	Simulated use or clinical logic fails to reflect actual care conditions
Design transfer and change control	Reassessment of modified risk profile	Updated traceability and residual risk review	Did manufacturing translation or design change alter prior safety assumptions?	Process changes introduce new interfaces, tolerances, or variability
Production and post-production	Signal collection and feedback	Surveillance-linked risk review	Which real-world signals require corrective action or redesign?	Recurrent incidents, drift patterns, infection signals, and software anomalies

Table 2. Post-freeze monitoring architecture for residual risk in Class III life-sustaining devices [1–10]

Signal domain	Leading indicator	Review cadence	Design implication	Responsible function
Mechanical integrity	Fatigue trend, seal degradation, abnormal wear	Periodic and event-triggered	Reassess durability margins and packaging design	Reliability engineering

Biological interface	Infection pattern, inflammatory response, thrombogenic events	Continuous trend review	Reevaluate materials, coatings, and implant procedure assumptions	Clinical and biocompatibility team
Functional performance	Signal drift, output instability, and power irregularity	Periodic trending with threshold alarms	Reopen control limits and performance specifications	Systems engineering
Software and connectivity	Recurring anomaly class, failed update behavior, cybersecurity-relevant deviation.	Continuous surveillance	Revise software controls, update architecture, and strengthen safety fallback logic	Software quality and cybersecurity
Use-related safety	Recurrent user deviation, maintenance error, interpretation error	Scheduled human factors review	Refine interface, instructions, training, and service process	Human factors and field support
Corrective action effectiveness	Recurrence after Corrective and Preventive Action or field action	Milestone-based review	Decide whether containment is sufficient or redesign is needed	Quality and regulatory affairs

The value of this monitoring architecture lies in its ability to transform surveillance into design intelligence. A mature Class III program does not wait for a recall-level pattern before reinterpreting residual risk. It looks for shifts in signal quality, complication clustering, replacement patterns, and failure recurrence that indicate erosion of prior assumptions. Once those signals are visible, the manufacturer can decide whether the appropriate response is a documentation update, a process correction, a design modification, or a renewed clinical evaluation.

From an applied standpoint, the most defensible integration sequence is straightforward. Risk planning starts before design inputs are finalized. Hazard framing then shapes the safety-critical input set. Architecture decisions are reviewed against control allocation. Verification is built around control effectiveness, not around generic requirement coverage. Validation tests the complete system in realistic use conditions. Post-market data are preassigned to risk review pathways before launch. In this sequence, ISO 14971 ceases to be an isolated standard. It becomes the logic that binds engineering, clinical evidence, and regulatory readiness into one continuous development system.

V. CONCLUSION

The research showed that ISO 14971 requirements are most effective when embedded as decision logic in design planning, design input definition, control allocation, verification, validation, and change management.

Class III life-sustaining and implantable devices expand hazard analysis beyond ordinary component failure. Long-term in vivo stability, biological interaction, software behavior, material degradation, and evidence uncertainty all reshape the structure of verification and validation.

Sustainable integration requires a lifecycle model in which premarket controls, residual risk evaluation, and post-market signal capture remain connected through traceability and structured review. In this form, ISO 14971 supports safer design execution, stronger evidence architecture, and greater regulatory readiness for high-risk medical technologies.

REFERENCES

- [1] Bano, A., Künzler, J., Wehrli, F., Kastrati, L., Rivero, T., Llane, A., Valz Gris, A., Fraser, A. G., Stettler, C.,

- Hovorka, R., Laimer, M., Bally, L., & CORE-MD investigators. (2024). Clinical evidence for high-risk CE-marked medical devices for glucose management: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Diabetes, Obesity and Metabolism*, 26(10), 4753–4766. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dom.15849>
- [2] Babboni, S., Sicari, R., Russo, L., Mattoli, V., Basta, G., & Del Turco, S. (2025). *Small Science*, 5, e202500379. <https://doi.org/10.1002/smsc.202500379>
- [3] Food and Drug Administration. (2024, February 2). Medical devices, quality system regulation amendments. *Federal Register*. <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/02/2024-01709/medical-devices-quality-system-regulation-amendments>
- [4] Food and Drug Administration. (2026, February 2). *Quality management system regulation (QMSR)*. <https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/postmarket-requirements-devices/quality-management-system-regulation-qmsr>
- [5] Freyer, O., Jahed, F., Ostermann, M., Rosenzweig, C., Werner, P., & Gilbert, S. (2024). Consideration of cybersecurity risks in the benefit-risk analysis of medical devices: Scoping review. *Journal of Medical Internet Research*, 26, e65528. <https://doi.org/10.2196/65528>
- [6] Jurczak, K. M., van der Boon, T. A. B., Devia-Rodriguez, R., et al. (2025). Recent regulatory developments in EU Medical Device Regulation and their impact on biomaterials translation. *Bioengineering & Translational Medicine*, 10(2), e10721. <https://doi.org/10.1002/btm2.10721>
- [7] Kearney, B., & McDermott, O. (2023). The challenges for manufacturers of the increased clinical evaluation in the European Medical Device Regulations: A quantitative study. *Therapeutic Innovation & Regulatory Science*, 57, 783–796. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s43441-023-00527-z>
- [8] Khan, A. A., & Kim, J.-H. (2024). Recent advances in materials and manufacturing of implantable devices for continuous health monitoring. *Biosensors and Bioelectronics*, 261, 116461. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bios.2024.116461>
- [9] Manimuthukumar, O., Manjuladevi, M., & Arunkumar, T. (2025). Global trends in post-market surveillance of high-risk medical devices: An empirical analysis based on regulatory data. *Indian Journal of Medical Research*, 162(2), 163–168. https://doi.org/10.25259/IJMR_86_2025
- [10] Mariello, M. (2025). Reliability and stability of bioelectronic medicine: A critical and pedagogical perspective. *Bioelectronic Medicine*, 11, Article 16. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s42234-025-00179-4>
- [11] Pannonhalmi, Á., Sipos, B., Kurucz, R. I., Katona, G., Kemény, L., & Csóka, I. (2025). Advancing regulatory oversight of medical device trials to align with clinical drug standards in the European Union. *Pharmaceuticals*, 18(6), 876. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ph18060876>
- [12] Shawon, M. S. R., Sotade, O. T., Li, J., Hill, M. D., Strachan, L., Challis, G., King, K., Ooi, S.-Y., & Jorm, L. (2024). Factors associated with cardiac implantable electronic device-related infections, New South Wales, 2016–21: A retrospective cohort study. *Medical Journal of Australia*, 220, 510–516. <https://doi.org/10.5694/mja2.52302>
- [13] Yogeve, D., Goldberg, T., Arami, A., Tejman-Yarden, S., Winkler, T. E., & Maoz, B. M. (2023). Current state of the art and future directions for implantable sensors in medical technology: Clinical needs and engineering challenges. *APL Bioengineering*, 7(3), 031506. <https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0152290>
- [14] Food and Drug Administration. (1997, March 11). Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers: Guidance for Industry (archived). <https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/guidance-documents-medical-devices-and-radiation-emitting-products/withdrawn-or-expired-guidance>
- [15] International Organization for Standardization. (2019). ISO 14971:2019 Medical devices – Application of risk management to medical devices. <https://www.iso.org/standard/72704.html>